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Post by seanismorris on Nov 4, 2014 18:33:57 GMT -5
The shorts and AF try so hard...you just have to laugh ; )
I can't wait for Afrezza sales and Mannkind's earnings to arrive next year.
I wonder how AF will spin the news when Afrezza passes 1B in sales....
Probably with "while Afrezza has done suprisingly well, but Mannkind stock is fully valued at 15$ and expectations for the global launch should be muted due to pricing concerns. Now is the time to sell."
Then at 3B in sales...
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Post by tchalaa on Nov 5, 2014 9:48:17 GMT -5
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Post by brentie on Nov 5, 2014 11:05:36 GMT -5
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Post by tchalaa on Nov 5, 2014 13:15:27 GMT -5
... Afrezza may reach the EU markets by 2017 RBC analysts forecast that Afrezza will hit the U.S. market in 2015 and European markets in 2017. Sanofi will begin preparations for the EU regulatory filing of Afrezza after the U.S. launch. The research firm says Afrezza sales will peak at more than $7 billion. FDA has asked MannKind to conduct three more studies, pediatric, long-term safety and dosing. The company said it was in talks with the U.S. regulators, and plans to start these studies after launch. Recently, Sanofi said at its earnings call that its blockbuster diabetes drug Lantus was facing pricing pressure due to low-cost competing drugs from Novo Nordisk A/S (ADR) (NYSE:NVO). MannKind said that the pricing pressures don’t apply at its Afrezza (basal vs. meal time). JPMorgan analyst Cory Kasimov said that Sanofi is the “best case scenario partner.” But JPMorgan remains skeptical about commercial potential of Afrezza. ... valuewalk.com/2014/11/mannkind-corporation-lantus-afrezza/
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Post by jpg on Nov 5, 2014 14:08:35 GMT -5
... RBC analysts forecast that Afrezza will hit the U.S. market in 2015 and European markets in 2017. Sanofi will begin preparations for the EU regulatory filing of Afrezza after the U.S. launch. The research firm says Afrezza sales will peak at more than $7 billion. valuewalk.com/2014/11/mannkind-corporation-lantus-afrezza/7 billion peak sales vs little or no sales according to AF, Kliff et al. Hmmm... that is one big gap. JPG
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Post by dreamboatcruise on Nov 5, 2014 14:38:54 GMT -5
What is the share price target given by RBC?
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Post by esstan2001 on Nov 5, 2014 15:09:20 GMT -5
If that is annualized, and mnkd nets 22% of that to he bottom line (~ 1.5B) at 400M shares outstanding and a P/E of around 30... ==> $100+ / share.
Wonder what timeframe they expect his to occur in... fast growth would bump P/E; curious to discount this to today's value.
Analysts are really all over the map.
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Post by dreamboatcruise on Nov 5, 2014 15:34:26 GMT -5
If that is annualized, and mnkd nets 22% of that to he bottom line (~ 1.5B) at 400M shares outstanding and a P/E of around 30... ==> $100+ / share. Wonder what timeframe they expect his to occur in... fast growth would bump P/E; curious to discount this to today's value. Analysts are really all over the map. I don't really think it valid to apply a 30 P/E to a max revenue value. 30 P/E would only apply with further fast growth anticipated. This statement of course is from the perspective of pretending that Afrezza is all that MNKD has up its sleeve. If one took a very conservative 12 P/E and assume that the $7B is 5 years out, using a discount of 15% per year to get current target share price would yield around $23/sh. I'd be interested in how RBC does the math to come up with current price target based on $7B max sales.
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Post by mrhaigs on Nov 5, 2014 19:17:41 GMT -5
If that is annualized, and mnkd nets 22% of that to he bottom line (~ 1.5B) at 400M shares outstanding and a P/E of around 30... ==> $100+ / share. Wonder what timeframe they expect his to occur in... fast growth would bump P/E; curious to discount this to today's value. Analysts are really all over the map. I don't really think it valid to apply a 30 P/E to a max revenue value. 30 P/E would only apply with further fast growth anticipated. This statement of course is from the perspective of pretending that Afrezza is all that MNKD has up its sleeve. If one took a very conservative 12 P/E and assume that the $7B is 5 years out, using a discount of 15% per year to get current target share price would yield around $23/sh. I'd be interested in how RBC does the math to come up with current price target based on $7B max sales. 12 eps for a baby stage pharma?? Try 30 at a minimum. Look around the market.
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Post by dreamboatcruise on Nov 5, 2014 19:25:46 GMT -5
Mrhaigs... the analysis is based on looking at a future share price when Afrezza is at its peak sales of $7B. It is no longer a baby stage pharma at that point. You don't get to pick a point in time when revenue is at its max and pretend it will continue to grow as if a baby. Valuing it at $23/sh is probably more than 30 p/e on next years earnings precisely because the growth ahead of it would still be huge.
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Post by tchalaa on Nov 6, 2014 13:12:46 GMT -5
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Post by otherottawaguy on Nov 6, 2014 13:41:00 GMT -5
Can you paste the article in?
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Post by kc on Nov 6, 2014 17:20:22 GMT -5
anybody read this WSJ article today. blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/11/06/sticking-point-the-sanofi-diabetes-franchise-is-key-to-sorting-out-the-mess/Meanwhile, Sanofi must hope a recent deal Mr. Viehbacher struck with MannKind Corp. to market the Afrezza inhaled insulin product will be a winner. Opinion is divided. Despite a crash-and-burn experience Pfizer Inc. suffered with such a product, supporters say Afrezza has a better delivery system and many diabetics don’t like injectables. Afrezza will be priced similarly to some injectable devices, but skeptics say diabetics will still have other options and payers must be convinced to give Afrezza preferential treatment for deciding reimbursement. If the Afrezza deal sputters, one analyst says Sanofi may have to make a drastic decision.
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Post by jpg on Nov 6, 2014 20:20:41 GMT -5
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Post by kc on Nov 7, 2014 13:20:23 GMT -5
An article from 2008 that is worth reading again today to restore you confidence in why Sanofi decided to partner with MannKind on Afrezza. the title of the article is: THE FAILURE OF EXUBERA: ARE WE BEATING A DEAD HORSE? by Lutz Heinemann in the Diabetes Science technology Journal. Which is the same group where Alfred Mann spoke to this AM.
dst.sagepub.com/content/2/3/518.full.pdf+html
If you don't read the long transcript perhaps this is the biggest take away point:
In hindsight, it was a smart decision by Sanofi-Aventis to step out of the cooperation with Pfizer and to cash a huge amount of money for the world’s second largest insulin plant in Germany and their share in Exubera development. It is most likely that Sanofi-Aventis had anticipated correctly the problem with the European health care systems (see later). As a result, the only company that is still active and that has a late phase of clinical development is MannKind. A direct consequence of this development is that other companies that are developing inhaled insulin formulations appear to have issues in finding adequate partners/investors in view of the billions of dollars burned by inhaled insulin (i.e., Nektar). The fate of inhaled insulin most likely also hampers the development of all other alternative routes of insulin administration (ARIA).
So do you think that the Sanofi board went into this partnership blindly to fail with MannKind? I don't think so. They had their eyes wide open and have had over 6 years to study what Afrezza was all about and what it could and not do in the diabetes market place.
One more take away from the article:
Would the story of Exubera have ended differently if it was not Pfizer but a different pharmaceutical company that brought this product to the market? For most diabetologists and patients with diabetes, Pfizer does not have the reputation of being a “true” diabetes company. Pfizer as a company also has no history and experience with insulin therapy; it appeared as if Exubera was an unusual product for their sales representatives (to phrase it carefully). One clear lesson of the Exubera story is that relying on a huge marketing machine (showing specific advertisement spots for Exubera on TV!) and its position as the world’s largest pharmaceutical company (with its deep pockets) is not sufficient to make such a product a success story. Pharmaceutical companies with more history/reputation in insulin therapy and a sales organization that is familiar with all the details of this type of diabetes therapy probably would have done somewhat better; however, the decisions made by Novo Nordisk, Eli Lilly, and some years ago by Sanofi-Aventis indicate that even such companies are not too sure about their market success. Even if Pfizer was probably not the ideal company to bring the first such product to the market, Exubera would have found at least some acceptance and place in diabetes therapy if it would have been a real strong product with many good properties. However, it was such a disaster from a sales point of view that even Pfizer (with all the bad effects of such a move on its image) could not keep it in its portfolio. Put simply, the costs of keeping all the support lines up and running that are mandatory for such a product (about which most physicians, patients, and insurance companies have no idea about) are so high that even a big pharmaceutical company cannot cover this over a prolonged period of time. Clearly Pfizer, to be more precise, its marketing department, was not able to convince either patients or diabetologists about the opportunities that Exubera offered during the unimpressive launch of this product (see earlier discussion) and the time thereafter. Just having a big booth at each diabetes congress is not sufficient. Talking with the sales representatives at the booth quickly revealed that they were trained to sell Exubera like any other drug but had no in-depth understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of this product. Also, a number of symposia organized by Pfizer at which experts (like myself) present only a positive view on Exubera (which I always tried to avoid…) does not fit anymore in a world in which physicians are able to critically review clinical study data themselves and are at the same time very cost sensitive. A more balanced and fair presentation, describing the benefits on one side while not ignoring potential risks and limitations on the other, is more adequate nowadays. A lesson for the pharmaceutical industry and their marketing departments in general is that you are in trouble when you cannot adequately convince your target population about the advantages of your product. The conventional approaches employed by the marketing people failed in the case of Exubera. Without an adequate adjustment of the marketing strategy, there is a high risk that this story will be repeated with other novel products.
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