|
Post by matt on Nov 16, 2020 16:02:57 GMT -5
Exactly correct, and your admitted generous number also assumes that 100% of Tyvaso sales are converted to the new delivery system. Getting physicians to change prescribing habits is not easy, and if the new formulation costs significantly more than the liquid then the managed care companies writing the checks may have a strong opinion about what they are willing to pay. MNKD has experience putting an established drug into better deliver system that costs a lot more than other options, and that story has not ended so well. At the end of the day, the acquiring company's board (and in some cases their shareholders) has to approve the transaction. A takeout premium much above 35% for what is essentially a single drug delivery technology where most of the key patents are already in the public domain is a stretch. Remember that everybody has a boss, and convincing the acquiring company's management to stick their necks out that far is a challenge. So you’re saying a tender between $3 and 4 per share would be more realistic at this point in time, if there were such an offer being contemplated. The price as I write this post is $2.81, so a takeout price closer to $4 is realistic. Realize though that if there were no buyers six months ago when the market price was $1.25, there probably won't be any buyers at the higher price either. The company has Afrezza, a drug delivery technology, and some royalties coming from the UTHR collaboration. That is also what the company had six months ago, so while a few events may be closer than they were before, the fundamental story has not changed. Acquirers don't chase after companies with rising prices unless they are desperate for something the portfolio.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 15, 2020 15:25:42 GMT -5
I cannot see a $10 tender. That values the company at $2.3B and nobody is going to bid that multiple. The Tyvaso net sales for last quarter were $129M, assume for a moment that Mannkind are getting the 20% royalties (I think this is generous, Medtronics only get 10%) then the quarterly cost to UTHR is $26M($104M a year). At that rate it would take more than 22 years to recover the cost. That is not a viable ROI as it stands. This could change with the label extension, but it would need to change an awful lot to make a purchase at that price viable. Exactly correct, and your admitted generous number also assumes that 100% of Tyvaso sales are converted to the new delivery system. Getting physicians to change prescribing habits is not easy, and if the new formulation costs significantly more than the liquid then the managed care companies writing the checks may have a strong opinion about what they are willing to pay. MNKD has experience putting an established drug into better deliver system that costs a lot more than other options, and that story has not ended so well. At the end of the day, the acquiring company's board (and in some cases their shareholders) has to approve the transaction. A takeout premium much above 35% for what is essentially a single drug delivery technology where most of the key patents are already in the public domain is a stretch. Remember that everybody has a boss, and convincing the acquiring company's management to stick their necks out that far is a challenge.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 13, 2020 14:44:16 GMT -5
Anyone know what the current at the market facility is at? With the share price rising I have a feeling they will be using it. They are capped at $50 million. They are capped until they aren't. While Cantor signed up to a $50 million facility, if a company blows through that facility there is not much paperwork required to set-up another $50 million facility, either with Cantor or somebody else. The only legal limit to a company raising money is the lack of authorized shares, and at September 30 there were 400 million shares authorized against 231 million shares issued and outstanding. That leaves a lot of wiggle room for additional funding via the ATM or otherwise.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 10, 2020 10:01:56 GMT -5
A convertible note is a hybrid security that can be valued as the sum of the pieces. There is the value of the 7% bond maturing in 2024, the fair value of which can be estimated by looking at what companies similar to MNKD have to pay for vanilla debt of the same maturity and priority in liquidation (it would be more than 7%). There is also the value of a four-year call option to buy MNKD stock at $10, the value of which can also be estimated using various methods.
Companies offer hybrid securities because they are cheaper to issue than straight debt, and if wonderful things happen and the option portion is in the money in 2024 that is a good problem to have. Holders of convertible notes rarely convert before the expiration date because when a note is converted to stock the value of the option is cancelled, and a shareholder has more risk than a debt holder if the business situation goes south. So the winning strategy for the note holder is to hold the note all the way to maturity (or just a few days before expiration) before deciding whether to convert or not. Some holders will short the stock a few days before maturity, immediately give conversion notice to the company, and deliver the newly converted shares to the broker to cover the short; this is a common way to lock in a gain on the convertible without taking any market risk.
The one flaw in your statement is that most convertibles are structured as zero coupon bonds such that the holder delivers the bond in exchange for the shares, and since the bond includes the accrued interest, the holder has to surrender the interest when they exercise the conversion option. This does not always happen, but as I recall the Mann Group is not entitled to current interest payments. You would have to read the security agreement to discover those details.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 9, 2020 8:28:39 GMT -5
Much appreciated Aged. I wish I could find that in the 10Q though. I’ve scoured through the 70+ pages and my tired eyes did not see it. Do you know if it said how the agreement will be amended? Nobody knows how the agreement will be amended until it is announced. Midcap seems a bit more risk averse than the Deerfield Funds and until now they have been willing to waive a covenant breach only in exchange for restricting an equal amount of balance sheet cash. MNKD simply doesn't have enough cash to continue doing that, and absent raising equity they won't be able to do so on an on-going basis. I would not look for Midcap to relax the covenants very much; that is not something lenders do very often unless things are going well for the borrower. I have a suspicion (purely that, it is just a guess) that the discussion of a sale/leaseback of the Darien facility is designed to turn that asset into roughly $20 million in cash. If that can be accomplished then Midcap can reduce their exposure to the company by reducing the principal outstanding $20 million and MNKD could hold enough cash collateral to cover the remaining $25 million. With an expected milestone from UTHR in the near term that will give the company enough cash to operate for a few more quarters. At this point it is a game of timing; UTHR royalties will start at some time in the future and MNKD needs to stay funded until that point is reached. A quarter of fresh cash here, a quarter there, and the gap can be closed.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 6, 2020 17:40:09 GMT -5
The obvious solution is that MNKD is going to pay off the MidCap loan, penalties and all, with proceeds from the sale of the Danbury plant. The single largest beneficiary of Danbury being unencumbered, other than MNKD, is UTHR. UTHR is also one entity that can guarantee the Danbury plant is going to generate enough revenue to pay the rent. Matt's Q4 money calculations don't include the next UTHR $12.5M milestone. Prudent, because it's not cash received yet. But it's expected in Q4 That is about the only plausible solution. Midcap has to be paid, which means $40 million plus accrued interest from September, plus 8% in exit fees and penalties, but at the same time if that happens it contradicts the latest 10-Q filing which said: "The Company intends to amend the Midcap Credit Facility to address this probable covenant violation; however, such amendment, if completed, would occur after the date of this report." It would not make much sense to amend the Midcap covenants unless the company can get rid of the albatross around its neck completely. That would be the smart thing to do and I would hate to see the Midcap debt paid down but have the covenants remain, even if softened. You are correct that I did not include the $12.5 million in milestones, but I also did not include the cash burn that will happen in Nov and Dec (about $18MM) which is significantly more than the milestone payment. The question is whether UTHR loves MNKD as much as MNKD loves UTHR. United wanted, and got, a license to the technology, so while MNKD is the logical manufacturer they are not the only one that can make this product. Regardless, sale of the plant is not going to fix this cash problem. I still think a significant equity raise is prudent, albeit painful for longs.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 6, 2020 12:53:14 GMT -5
As I mentioned earlier, why not just try and get a loan from Uthr that is convertable and collateralized against Trep T royalties, as it seems they are now partners for a long time. It would be useful if everyone would read the security agreement between Midcap and MNKD. It defines "collateral" as all assets of the corporation that it may hold as of the date of the agreement and any asset the company may acquire in the future, and that includes proceeds of any license agreement. You can read the details in the Security Agreement and Schedule A thereto. To be clear, the company cannot sell any asset to any party without the proceeds of that sale going straight to Midcap, and since Midcap's lien covers all assets there is nothing available to offer as collateral to another party like UTHR. If UTHR wants to make a loan to MNKD that is convertible, they can certainly do that, but that loan cannot be collateralized by future royalties because Midcap already has a lien on that income stream. The only lienholder than can jump in front of Midcap is one designated by law (like the IRS lien that automatically accrues on employee payroll tax withholdings). The company is scraping the bottom of the barrel at this point. Current liabilities (defined by accountants as liabilities that must be paid within the next 12 months) exceeded the total assets of the company by $11 million as of September 30. Meanwhile, the net cash burn from operations for third quarter exceeded $9 million per month so by now the difference between current liabilities and total assets has grown to $20 million (net of any stock issuances on the ATM). UTHR will pay royalties some day, but today is not that day and neither is tomorrow. Sale of shares is the only feasible way to bridge the chasm between now and when those royalty streams kick in since the company has run out of easy options, and we don't know what additional handcuffs Midcap will apply for missing the sales covenants (which company has already admitted they will miss). It would be nice to have a simple fix, but absent share dilution there really isn't anything the company can do in the short term. Long term is a different story.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 6, 2020 10:41:26 GMT -5
Even though matt seems forever negative (nothing wrong with it!), he is very knowledgeable as per his posts. From his views on depreciation of the plant (and the insides being almost worthless for others - my understanding), it could be barely enough to satisfy the $30-35 million for Midcap? May be that's why they are pushing this sell and lease back? Assuming, the sale is done, MNKD will have new recurring lease payment. Not sure how much would that be.. I'm not an accountant. But, I think you can write off profit against depreciated assets? I just remember reading somewhere - no idea.. The reason pharma plants have little residual value is as follows: 1. The exterior shell of the building (literally the fours walls and the roof) plus any attached warehouse and office space are pretty generic. Those have value to any purchaser of industrial property and will fetch the going price in Darien for a building of that age and condition. 2. Inside the building is what I call "the box". The box is an empty shell that does nothing but keep the rain out and provide some insulation. Inside the box, production rooms are built and any necessary utilities (like air handling for clean rooms) are run between the top of the production room and the roof of the box because there is a lot of space up there. A single box might have twenty different production rooms depending on the size of the plant. 3. The production rooms themselves are built to house a specific production process and each of them is unique. If a different product moves into the space, the existing room is taken down and a new room is built in its place. Some factories use modular walls that are moveable and this reduces the cost of reconfiguration, but the bigger expense is moving around the utilities. Sometimes the room is just demolished as the materials are not that costly. That is why the interior of the plant has little value to a new purchaser; it is almost inconceivable that a new purchaser can recycle MNKDs room layout into an efficient facility so they just demolish what they find and start over. 4. A lot of the money is spent on production equipment that goes inside the room. Production equipment that is fairly modern (say,five years old or newer) has a resale value of about 10 cents on the dollar. Why so low? It has to do with drug regulation. When a drug goes through clinical trials, the production process is part of what is approved. If in Plant A a company controls a production process with a piece of equipment from ThermoFisher and in Plant B there is a similar piece of equipment produced by Siemens, that production process has to be totally revalidated in case the ThermoFisher instrument performs differently from the Siemens instrument. This is expensive to do and, more importantly, revalidation is very time consuming and extends the length of the project just when additional production capacity is needed. So pharma companies are in the habit of ordering the exact same equipment from the exact same manufacturers when they build out a new production suite because the additional costs involved are normally less than the loss of sales caused by the delay. Even using identical equipment does not guarantee that the final product will be identical, but if there is a problem it is easier to track down the reason for it. So, that is why the outside of the building has considerable value to a third-party buyer, but the inside of the box has much less value. And yes, depreciation is a tax-deductible expense that reduces the income subject to tax. This only helps if the entity is a taxpayer and, as of now, MNKD has $3 billion in tax loss carryforwards. The company does not need any more tax deductions!
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 5, 2020 8:33:31 GMT -5
This was suggested and discussed on this board about two years ago as one option to improve the cash situation without requiring traditional fund raising dilution. Some suggested the valuation of the plant would be too low to make this worthwhile. Others disagreed. I see this as a bridge potential between now and when revenue increases allowing the company to possibly buy back the lease and plant at the pre-determined price. Interesting that it's now being considered. Right, and I believe matt (could be some one else) who read the docs said the plant was held as collateral by the lender at that time (forgot the name), and hence it was not possible to do so. May be things have changed? After a long time, I skipped their CC (may be 2nd/3rd time?). I still have a bunch of shares, but gotten off with the crazy addiction! Hopefully they will get us *some* return by 2022/23? The plant used to be security for Deerfield, but now it is security for Midcap so the same rule applies. Just like a home mortgage, you cannot sell your house to a third party and pocket the money if you still owe $100K to the bank on a mortgage. Midcap might be pushing them to do a sale / leaseback to reduce their exposure to bankruptcy, but if there are net proceeds from a sale that cash will go to reducing debt (i.e. Midcap will get the money, not MNKD). Everything of value that MNKD owns is similarly encumbered by the security agreement so any strategy that relies on asset sales to generate operating cash is a non-starter. The plant building and associated land may have some value, but processing equipment inside the plant has hardly any value due to the way drug production is regulated and the cost of relocating and revalidating equipment. prcgorman2 noted that there is no property tax on a leaseback which, in principal, is true but in reality is false. Virtually all commercial property leases are quoted as "triple net", which means that the tenant pays the stated rate per square foot, but the landlord also recovers a pro-rata share of his operating expenses, maintenance costs, and property taxes. So you might see rent quoted as $30 gross per square foot, $27 net which means that the estimated share of the reimbursable expenses are $3 per square foot. However, the tenant has to pay the actual expenses so if the building needs a new roof or the property taxes increase then the lease will exceed the $3 expense stop and the tenant might be on the hook for $4 instead of the expected $3. So yes, the property tax is assessed on the landlord rather than the tenant, but the economic effect of the tax will still be borne by the tenant in the gross rent calculation. It is somewhat of a concern that this 10-Q has increased the level of disclosures associated with a default on the Midcap facility. The 10-Q that posted to EDGAR was a "red line" version that highlights in red differences between the filed copy and a previous version (that was likely posted in error, I have never seen any company post a red line version of a quarterly filing). There are several places where it is stated that missing the covenants at year end is probable unless the Midcap agreement can be successfully renegotiated, and the entire Midcap balance (around $40 million) has been reclassed as a current liability from long-term debt due to the risk of default. Most well financed companies maintain a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 2:1 (i.e. there are two dollars of liquid assets available to pay each dollar of liabilities that are coming due in the next year). MNKD's current ratio was 0.63:1 at September 30, and with the company's burn rate that number will be 0.5:1 later this month.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Nov 4, 2020 17:30:32 GMT -5
Generally LT liability of this nature is treated as a reserve. The expense hit has been taken so when excess inventory is actually discarded it is charged against the reserve rather than the income statement. However, the auditors will not let the company write the inventory off until it is actually disposed because that would open up all sorts of possibilities to game income in future quarters. Thus they can book the expense now, but so long as the physical inventory remains theoretically useable both the asset and the liability remain on the books.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Oct 31, 2020 9:32:38 GMT -5
Does that mean that is the only indication they looking to use TreT? Also, it sounds like MNKD can't expect much in the way of royalties until some time in 2022. Are there any further payments coming from UTHR before that? Yes, the 30,000 patients they reference are an expanded indication for their existing drug. Don't expect significant royalties 2022, at this point the new formulation doesn't even have FDA approval and, while the drug is already licensed, UTHR has to prove equivalency to their existing product. That work is already in progress, but expect at least six months to approve the amendment once the file is submitted to FDA. Only after there is an approved marketing license and a product launch will there be sales, and it will take some time to get patients converted over to a new formulation. Remember also that royalties are on a lag basis so sales take place before royalties are paid. That is just the way it goes with drug licenses so you have to be a bit patient.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Oct 12, 2020 15:45:11 GMT -5
Imagine getting ready to board a flight, swing by Starbucks and have a dreamboat that will take the edge off and be out of your system by the time you land. I racked up over 3 million frequent flyer miles as a globe trotter for a major corporation. It used to be two Excedrine PM and a large quantity of Scotch that got me across the Pacific, especially when heading to Australia and New Zealand on those damn night flights. A quick puff on the old inhaler would be a welcome alternative.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Oct 9, 2020 9:44:47 GMT -5
I for one believe that VDEX should publish its prescription numbers and retention rate numbers. Their lack of transparency understandably causes people to question whether their efforts have been successful or whether they are trying to hide something. From what I read on this thread, I believe Le Anne and the team are working hard and doing a great job. If the % of Afrezza sales were only 15%, as Morfu suggests, I would regard that as great news. VDEX is growing and their contribution to sales is growing, so 15% would be a great start.VDEX efforts seem especially important now since it seems that MNKD strategy is to lay low, cut costs and ride out the low Afrezza scripts until TrepT royalties kick in. If I was advising VDEX I would tell them not to publish that data. There is only downside to VDEX in disclosing this. VDEX will be sharing the information with investors because they need to know, but for people on this board? No. Providing the data would help other companies decide if this was an area they wanted to compete in. Why would you do that? What our hippie friend says ^^^^^. Companies that are publicly traded have an obligation to disclose such information, but private companies do not. The lack of transparency to the competition has value and it is the price companies pay for lack of access to the public financial markets. Fewer and fewer companies are choosing to be public and there is good reason for that.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Oct 7, 2020 15:10:15 GMT -5
Nothing I read says that this partnership is exclusive. Dexcom and Mannkind could still partner up as could Dexcom and any other insulin manufacturer. That is technically true, but this is a co-promotion agreement (at least that is how the PR is written) so Lilly is required to promote Dexcom and vice versa. Yes, in theory Dexcom could co-promote with another insulin manufacturer just like Lilly could co-promote with another pump company, but it rarely works that way. It is a bit like saying that you are engaged but since you are not legally married yet, you are both still free to date other people. Technically that is 100% true but how do you think that would work in reality?
The issue comes when a Dexcom sales rep is in a healthcare provider's office marketing the G6 Pro device. Do they co-promote the Lilly product, the Lilly and Mannkind product, or remain totally silent on the topic of which insulin to use? If they remain silent there really is no value in doing the co-promotion agreement in the first place, and why would Lilly keep up their end of the deal if Dexcom does not deliver on their commitments? A sales force needs to have a clear message and a consistent marketing strategy to execute; if the troops are confused it ends badly.
|
|
|
Post by matt on Oct 7, 2020 8:22:54 GMT -5
If Dexcom is going to partner with an insulin manufacturer then it makes sense to partner with the market leader, and that is Lilly. By doing so Dexcom alienates the other insulin manufacturers which is why it is important to pick the partner carefully. Abbott knows this too, and with Lilly partnered with Dexcom their logical target is Novo Nordisk, not Mannkind.
It is simple numbers; Lilly fills over 225,000 scripts a week, Novo fills more than 200,000, Mannkind fills 700. For a device manufacturer picking an insulin partner to help drive device sales the most desirable choices are pretty obvious.
|
|